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I. Introduction
What should lawyers do when their clients receive anonymous
death threats electronically during the pendency of litigation?
The authors spent nearly a year wrestling with this issue after
their clients in civil litigation began to receive pseudonymous threats
by email and on an Internet message board maintained by Yahoo!
Inc. Three months after the threats began, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) determined the identity of the perpetrator. After
another seven months, the local United States Attorney's office
commenced prosecution.
During the ten-month period before prosecution, however, the
perpetrator's identity remained a secret, pursuant to rules of federal
grand jury secrecy. The FBI agent and the assistant United States
Attorney handling the case knew, but were not permitted to tell us,
who was making the threats.
Fearing for the lives of our clients, we asked Yahoo! Inc. to do
what the federal authorities could not yet do-tell us the name of the
perpetrator. Yahoo! Inc. refused. We cited legal authority that we
believed not only allowed, but compelled, an Internet service
provider (ISP) to reveal voluntarily the identity of a subscriber who
has pseudonymously posted or emailed death threats. Yahoo! Inc.
still refused. We had to wait ten uneasy months, until prosecution
began and the veil of grand jury secrecy was lifted, to learn the
perpetrator's identity.
This article sets forth the reasons why we have concluded that an
ISP is not only permitted by federal law, but also obligated by
California law, to reveal upon request the identity of a subscriber who
has pseudonymously posted or emailed threats of death or great
bodily injury.
II. The Underlying Civil Litigation
Michelangelo Delfino and Mary E. Day were employed in
California at Varian Associates (which subsequently split into three
separate entities) since the 1980s.' George Zdasiuk was Delfino's
supervisor; Susan Felch was a co-worker.2 In 1998, Zdasiuk fired
Delfino, citing complaints about Delfino's workplace behavior and
1. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. H024214
(Cal. Ct. App. filed Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter AOB].
2. Id. at 3.
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strife between him and Felch.3 Day, who by then had become
romantically involved with Delfino, resigned later that year.'
After leaving Varian, Delfino and Day began to disparage
Varian, Zdasiuk, and Felch on the Internet! Several ISPs such as
Yahoo! Inc. maintain electronic message boards on which people can
post pseudonymous comments about various public companies,
including Varian.6 The message boards are freewheeling and
uncensored, and there are often very colorful and provocative
exchanges among the users.7 Delfino and Day enthusiastically joined
in the postings on various Varian message boards.8
Varian, Zdasiuk, and Felch retaliated by suing Delfino and Day
for, among other things, defamation and invasion of privacy.9 The
lawsuit precipitated a storm of message board postings about the
plaintiffs by Delfino and Day. By the time of trial two years later,
Delfino and Day had made more than 13,000 individual postings on
more than 100 message boards." They also created their own website
dedicated to commentary on the litigation."
In addition to criticisms of the lawsuit itself, Delfino and Day
targeted Zdasiuk, Felch, and other senior Varian executives for harsh
and unrelenting attacks. 2 Other pseudonymous posters retaliated on
Varian's behalf with message board postings attacking Delfino and
Day. Yahoo! Inc.'s message board for Varian degenerated into a
3. Id. at 3-4.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 4-7, 37-42.
6. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 936-37 (2000); Joshua R. Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-
SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against On-Line John Does as Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 213, 217-18 (2001); see also AOB, supra
n. 1, at 5.
7. See id.; see also Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
8. AOB, supra n. 1, at 4-7.
9. See Compl., Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. CV 780187 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County filed Feb. 25, 1999); see also AOB, supra n. 1, at 6.
10. AOB, supra n. 1, at 6; see e.g. Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Message Boards: VAR
<http://messages.yahoo.com/?action=q&board=var> (accessed Oct. 22, 2003); Yahoo! Inc.,
Yahoo! Message Boards: VSEA <http://messages.yahoo.com/?action=q&board=vsea>
(accessed Oct. 22, 2003).
11. AOB, supra n. 1, at 7; MoBeta, Inc. <http://www.geocities.com/mobeta-inc/slapp/
slapp.html> (accessed Oct. 22, 2003) (copies of the various pleadings and court orders
referenced in this article can be located at this site).
12. AOB, supra n. 1, at 4-7, 37-42.
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battleground. 3 The postings on both sides were often offensive,
degrading, puerile, and ugly. In the context of Internet message board
and chat-room debate, however, they were not unusual.
The lawsuit against Delfino and Day went to trial at the end of
2001. A jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs and awarded them
$775,000. 4 The judge issued an injunction ordering Delfino and Day
to cease from continuing to "publish, post, or otherwise disseminate,
directly or indirectly, on the Internet or elsewhere" twenty-three
categories of statements which the court "finds are untrue" and "were
shown to be false and defamatory.""
Delfino and Day appealed the judgment and retained us to
handle their appeal. 16 While the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs
asked the trial court to hold Delfino and Day in contempt for
violating the injunction, claiming they had continued to make
postings prohibited by the injunction. 7 We asked the California Court
of Appeal to issue a writ of supersedeas staying all proceedings to
enforce the trial court judgment, including the contempt proceeding,
during the pendency of the appeal. 8 The appellate court granted the
writ, leaving Delfino and Day free to continue their postings while the
appeal was pending. 9 They freely continued to post.
III. The Threats
Shortly after the appellate court issued the writ of supersedeas,
some of the postings by detractors of Delfino and Day on the Yahoo!
13. See Defs' Mot. for Discovery Pending Appeal, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino,
No. CV 780187 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed August 23, 2002); see also AOB,
supra n. 1, at 7-8.
14. AOB, supra n. 1, at 9.
15. Judgment 3-6, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. CV 780187 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County entered Feb. 13, 2002); see also AOB, supra n. 1, at 10.
16. Notice of Appeal to Sixth District Court of Appeal, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Delfino, No. CV 780187 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed Mar. 8, 2002).
17. See Pls.' Ex Parte Application for OSC Why Day and Delfino Should Not be
Held in Contempt for Violating Judgment, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. CV
780187 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed Mar. 11, 2002); see also AOB, supra n. 1, at
10.
18. See Petition for Writ of Supersedeas, Delfino v. Superior Court, No. H024214
(Cal. Ct. App. filed Apr. 12, 2002.)
19. Order Granting Writ of Supersedeas, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No.
H024214 (Cal. Ct. App. filed June 25, 2002). The appellate court subsequently reversed
portions of the injunction that prohibited continued postings, holding that those portions
were unconstitutional prior restraints; however, the court affirmed the damages portion of
the judgment. Varian Med. Sys, Inc. v. Delfino, 113 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2003); rehearing
denied, Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1854 (Dec. 12,
2003); petition for review filed, Dec. 23, 2003.
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Inc. message board for Varian took an ominous turn.0
Disparagement and ridicule gave way to threats of death and violent
physical injury. Postings under various pseudonyms warned of attacks
by hired thugs and discussed the types of weapons that would be
used.21
One poster stood out. He called himself "cracksmoking.jesus."
Over a three-month period he posted dozens of threats on the Varian
message board. For example:
"Mikey is going to DIE real soon. I hear he pissed off the wrong
people. Expected for a LOSER."
"I heard Mikey will have a hard time appealing his case after he's
DEAD. Count the days, loser ... you're going to suffer and someone
will laugh."
"I arranged for you to have a visitor. Have they been there yet?
If not, then they will visit soon. Don't say I didn't warn you. Criminal
matters are handled less carefully than civil matters."
"There's a big difference between a punch in the stomach and a
crowbar to the face. Or a beer bottle smashed on an open hand.... "22
After a few months, "cracksmoking-jesus" took to sending
email directly to Delfino under different pseudonyms. Two of these
missives were especially frightening:
"Keep it up, mother-fucker. I'll keep that in mind as I beat the
living crap out of you."
"It's coming, motherfucker, and you won't see it... you're going
to get your ass stomped by me and some friends .... You can look
forward to all [of] your fingers getting broken, several kicks to the
ribs and mouth, break some teeth, and a cracked head ... Maybe set
your place on fire ... If your cunt is there, she'll take a little ride to
the parts of San Jose where they don't speak english,... Die,
motherfucker. You'll wish you had."23
Under California law, these postings and email messages were
crimes. Such criminal threats are called "cyberstalking," which
consists of threatening "by means of an electronic communication
device" to "commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily
injury to another person, with the specific intent that the
20. See Defendants' Motion for Discovery Pending Appeal, Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Delfino, No. CV 780187 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County filed Aug. 23, 2002); see also
AOB, supra n. 1, at 8.
21. See Criminal Complaint, Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Sean Wells, United States
v. Moore, No. Cr. 503023 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 12, 2003) [hereinafter FBI Affidavit].
?? id.
23. Id.
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statement.., is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of
actually carrying it out... ,,24 Cyberstalking is also a federal offense
when perpetrated in interstate commerce."
IV. The FBI Investigation
We asked the FBI to investigate for possible violation of the
federal cyberstalking law. Three months later, the assistant United
States Attorney who was assigned to the case gave us good news and
bad news. The good news was that a perpetrator had been identified.
The bad news was that the federal authorities were precluded by rules
of grand jury secrecy from revealing the perpetrator's identity unless
and until the perpetrator was prosecuted.26 The United States
Attorney's office had not yet decided whether to prosecute.
Many months later, we learned that the FBI had identified
Cameron Alden Moore, an engineer employed by Agilent
Technologies in Colorado, as the perpetrator of threats made under
the alias "cracksmoking-jesus" and other pseudonyms. 7 The FBI
identified Moore through a federal grand jury subpoena issued to
Yahoo! Inc. for subscriber information on three Yahoo screen
names.28 The FBI agent handling the investigation then telephoned
Moore, who admitted having made the threats and promised he
would no longer post messages on the Varian message board.29
The decision to prosecute was not made for another seven
months, after Moore-astoundingly-resumed his threatening
message board postings." Until then, we were left to our own devices
to determine who was threatening to kill our clients.
V. Yahoo! Inc.'s Refusal to Identify "cracksmokingjesus"
Some six months before Moore was arrested and his identity was
revealed, we asked Yahoo! Inc., through its legal counsel, to tell us
the identity of "cracksmoking-jesus." We informed counsel of legal
24. Cal. Penal Code § 422 (West 1999).
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 2000).
26. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6.
27. See FBI Affidavit, supra n. 21.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Moore subsequently pleaded guilty to a lesser harassment offense (18 U.S.C.A. §
1512(d)(4) (West 2000)) and was placed on four years' probation with numerous
conditions, including six months of home confinement with electronic monitoring. See
Amended Judgment, United States v. Moore, No. CR 503023 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 31,
2003).
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authority that we believed not only allowed, but compelled, Yahoo!
Inc. to reveal the perpetrator's identity voluntarily, without the
intercession of a law enforcement agency. Yahoo! Inc.'s counsel
responded with a letter telling us that Yahoo! Inc. only would
respond to judicial process or to a request for information from a law
enforcement agency. They would not voluntarily tell us the name of
the Yahoo! Inc. subscriber who was using their services to perpetrate
the threats.
Yahoo! Inc.'s counsel advised us to file a so-called "John Doe"
action against "crack_smoking-jesus" and then to subpoena Yahoo!
Inc.'s subscriber records for him. We did not, however, consider that
to be an effective alternative. Varian had vigorously opposed two
prior attempts by Delfino and Day to subpoena subscriber records for
one of their anonymous detractors, and would certainly do so again.
Any attempt to learn the identity of "cracksmoking-jesus" through a
"John Doe" action would be expensive and prolonged-likely even
longer than it would take for the criminal process to run its course.
We would have to wait for the federal law enforcement
authorities to divulge the perpetrator's identity. And so we waited.
Nervously.
VI. The Private Investigation
In the meantime, working with a private investigator at
considerable cost to our clients, we discovered a number of clues
indicating that "cracksmoking-jesus" was Cameron Alden Moore.3
Our suspicions were confirmed when the prosecution was announced.
We also learned something the FBI had not discovered: Moore
had been a co-worker of Zdasiuk's wife.
32
Should Yahoo! Inc. have told us of Moore's identity when
asked? The answer to this question seems to lie in the 1976 case of
Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California3 and the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.34
31. Report of Investigation from Patricia de Larios Peyton (Dec. 10, 2002) (on file
with authors).
32. Id.
33. 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).
34. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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VII. The Tarasoff Duty For Psychotherapists
In Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California, a
troubled university student, Prosenjit Poddar, told a school
psychotherapist that he intended to kill fellow student Tatiana
Tarasoff, who had spurned him. The therapist and a colleague
informed the campus police of the threat, but nobody warned
Tarasoff. Poddar subsequently killed her. Her parents sued for
wrongful death on a theory of negligent failure to warn of the threat. 5
The California Supreme Court allowed the lawsuit to go forward
on the ground that the "failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to
apprise her of the danger constituted a breach of the therapists' duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana."36 The court held that
when a therapist determines or should determine that a patient
''presents a serious danger of violence to another," the therapist
"incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger."37 This duty, said the court, "may require
the therapist to take one or more of various steps," one of which may
be "to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim
of the danger.""
The Tarasoff court relied on California Evidence Code section
1024, which prescribes an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege when the psychotherapist has reason to believe the patient
may be dangerous.39 The statute withholds the privilege "if the
psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in
such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or
to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger."'
According to the Tarasoff court, in enacting this exception the
California Legislature balanced the "countervailing concerns" of "the
public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and
in protecting the rights of patients to privacy" against "the public
interest in safety from violent assault," and the Legislature struck the
balance in favor of the safety interest.' Deferring to the Legislature,
the court concluded "that the public policy favoring protection of the
35. 17 Cal. 3d at 430-32.
36. Id. at 431.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 441.
40. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1024 (West 1995).
41. 551 P.2d at 346-47.
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confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications
must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert
danger to others.
4 2
VIII. Does the Tarasoff Duty Apply to Others?
In 1994, California Evidence Code section 956.5 was amended to
prescribe a similar exception to the attorney-client privilege. There is
no privilege "if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any
confidential communication relating to representation of a client is
necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm."43
Many scholars have argued persuasively that this exception to
the attorney-client privilege expands the scope of the Tarasoff duty to
include attorneys, for the same reason underlying the creation of the
psychotherapist's duty in Tarasoff: The Legislature has determined
that the public interest in safety outweighs the interest in
confidentiality.44
Other scholars have suggested that the Tarasoff duty might be
extended beyond psychotherapists and attorneys to cover school
officials who have notice of threats made by students against other
students;45 employers who are asked for references regarding former
employees who engaged in workplace violence while employed;
46
mediators who learn information from one party regarding threats to
others;47 police agencies and prisons that release inmates who are in
custody for threats or attacks made against specific victims;48 police
42. Id. at 347.
43. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 956.5 (West 1995).
44. See e.g. Michael A. Backstrom, Student Author, Unveiling the Truth When it
Matters Most: Implementing the Tarasoff Duty for California's Attorneys, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev.
139, 140 (1999); Jeffrey P. Kerrane, Will Tarasoff Liability Be Extended to Attorneys In
Light of New California Evidence Code Section 956.5?, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 825, 835-36
(1995); Marc L. Sands, Student Author, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn
Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 Tort & Ins. L.J. 355, 357
(1986); Thomas P. Anderson, Lawyers: A Call to Duty, 17 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 33, 64
(1986).
45. Melissa L. Gilbert, Student Author, "Time-Out" for Student Threats?: Imposing a
Duty to Protect on School Officials, 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2002).
46. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment References-Speak no Evil, Hear no Evil: A
Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 445, 452-54 (2002).
47. Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 147, 180-81 & n. 123 (2003).
48. Jeffrey A. Cross, The Repeated Sufferings of Domestic Violence Victims Not
Notified of Their Assailant's Pre-Trial Release from Custody: A Call for Mandatory
20031
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officers who fail to attempt to rescue individuals in peril;49 and parents
whose children commit torts.50
IX. Do ISPs Have a Tarasoff Duty?
If the Tarasoff duty applies beyond psychotherapists, should the
duty extend to ISPs that are made aware of death threats posted on
their systems against known third parties? The USA PATRIOT Act,
enacted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,"'
seems to do for ISPs what California Evidence Code section 1024
does for psychotherapists and what California Evidence Code section
956.5 apparently does for attorneys: create a duty to warn. The USA
PATRIOT Act profoundly changes the way federal law treats
potential liability for ISPs and the privacy interests of Internet users.
At the dawn of the Internet age, Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,52 which protected the privacy of
Internet users by prohibiting ISPs from disclosing the contents of an
electronic communication "to any person or entity, '53 with certain
exceptions such as where authorized by the user or required by a
governmental entity pursuant to a warrant.5
Later, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act of
1996,55 which afforded providers of interactive computer services a
considerable amount of protection from liability. Declaring a policy
"to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 56 the
1996 Act gave ISPs immunity from liability for defamation and
similar actions by prescribing that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
Domestic Violence Victim Notification Legislation, 34 U. Louis. J. Fam. L. 915, 923-26
(1995).
49. Lisa McCabe, Student Author, Police Officers' Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They
Only Good Samaritans?, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 661, 673-80 (1984).
50. Valerie D. Barton, Reconciling the Burden: Parental Liability for the Tortious
Acts of Minors, 51 Emory L.J. 877, 899-901 (2002).
51. The "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001" became
law on October 26, 2001. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also Scheidegger
et. al., Federalist Society White Paper on the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Criminal
Procedure Sections (2001) <www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf> (Apr. 15, 2002).
52. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
53. 100 Stat. at 1860-61 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (West Supp. 2003)).
54. 100 Stat. at 1861-62 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (West Supp. 2003)).
55. Pub. L. No. 104-104, §502, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2001).
[25:683
UNMASKING "CRACK SMOKING JESUS"
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."57
The USA PATRIOT Act strips away much of this privacy
protection for Internet users by its amendment to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. Now, an ISP may voluntarily disclose
an electronic communication to a "law enforcement agency"-
without any request by the agency or consent of the user-if the ISP
"in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death
or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without
delay of communications relating to the emergency."58 Similarly, the
ISP may voluntarily disclose customer records to a "governmental
entity"-again, without any request by the entity or consent of the
user-if the ISP "reasonably believes that an emergency involving
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
justifies disclosure of the information.... "59 Even more broadly, the
ISP may voluntarily disclose customer records "to any person other
than a governmental entity"-that is, to anyone else-without
restriction.6"
Thus, under the USA PATRIOT Act, email communications
receive some protection from voluntary disclosure: The ISP may only
disclose them to a law enforcement agency without request by the
agency in case of emergency. But customer records are virtually
unprotected from voluntary disclosure. The ISP can disclose them to
a governmental entity without request when there is an emergency,
and can disclose them to anyone else even without an emergency.
Just as California Evidence Code section 1024 provided the
statutory underpinning for the psychotherapist's duty declared in
Tarasoff, and California Evidence Code section 956.5 provides a
statutory underpinning for imposing a Tarasoff duty on attorneys, so
the USA PATRIOT Act provides a statutory underpinning for
imposing a Tarasoff duty on ISPs. The United States Congress has
determined for ISPs, like the California Legislature previously
determined for psychotherapists, that-to borrow language from
Tarasoff-"the public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character" of Internet communications and subscriber records "must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to
others.",
61
57. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2001).
58. 115 Stat. at 284 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (West Supp. 2003)).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) (West Supp. 2003).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(5) (West Supp. 2003).
61. 17 Cal. 3d at 4422.
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Plainly, privacy protection afforded to Internet communications
and subscriber records has been eroded by the USA PATRIOT Act.
What about the 1996 Communications Decency Act's protection from
liability? It is narrow, to the extent it only immunizes ISPs from
liability for defamation and the like by prescribing that an ISP shall
not be treated as the publisher or speaker of an electronic
communication.2 The 1996 Act does not preclude liability under state
negligence law for failure to warn, which does not require treatment
of the ISP as a publisher or speaker. To the contrary, the 1996 Act
seems to allow failure-to-warn liability: The section on civil liability
states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this
section., 63 Because liability for failure to warn does not require
treatment of the ISP as a publisher or speaker-which is all the 1996
Act precludes-failure-to-warn liability is consistent with the 1996
Act. Moreover, the Communications Decency Act specifically states
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or
any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law."
64
The USA PATRIOT Act provisions discussed above are
amendments to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
and are, therefore, not limited in any way by the Communications
Decency Act.
It is a short leap from statutory abrogation of confidentiality and
privacy in the interest of safety to judicial declaration of a duty of
disclosure and imposition of civil liability for breach of such duty. The
California Supreme Court in Tarasoff made that leap for
psychotherapists. The courts would likely do so for ISPs, too.
X. Did Yahoo! Inc. Have A Duty to Divulge the Identity of
"cracksmoking-jesus"?
When we asked Yahoo! Inc. to divulge voluntarily the identity of
"crack smokingjesus"-and were met with refusal-the USA
PATRIOT Act was only ten months old, and its impact on Internet
privacy had hardly begun to be debated. The time for full debate has
come.
The difficult question, however, is not so much whether there is a
duty of disclosure-Tarasoff seems to make that inevitable-as what
62. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2001).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2001).
64. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) (2001).
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is the extent of such duty. Is the duty limited to responding to a
request by a cyberstalking victim for the ISP to divulge the
perpetrator's identity? Or does the ISP have a broader duty of
independent investigation-that is, to monitor its message boards for
threatening postings and then seek out the victim, who might not be
aware of the postings, and give warning?
Tarasoff itself addressed a similar question regarding the extent
of the psychotherapist's duty: whether a psychotherapist who does
not know the identity of an intended victim has a duty "to interrogate
his patient to discover the victim's identity, or to conduct an
independent investigation."65 The court acknowledged "that in some
cases it would be unreasonable to require" an independent
investigation, but also observed that "there may also be cases in
which a moment's reflection will reveal the victim's identity."66 Thus,
the court concluded, "[t]he matter... is one which depends upon the
circumstances of each case, and should not be governed by any hard
and fast rule."67
In other words, there is no clear answer to the question whether
psychotherapists have a duty to investigate independently. It
"depends upon the circumstances of each case., 6' And so it will likely
be for ISPs. One of the factors to be considered in determining the
existence of a duty of care is "the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach., 69 If a court were to
determine that requiring ISPs to monitor their message boards for
cyberstalking would not be unduly burdensome, the court would
likely impose such a duty.
Under the circumstances we presented to Yahoo! Inc., however,
the question was not difficult. We were well aware of the threats and
the pseudonyms under which they were made. No independent
investigation was required of Yahoo! Inc. All we needed was for
Yahoo! Inc. to tell us the identity of a subscriber who called himself
"crack smoking-jesus." It would be no great leap for a court to
conclude, based on the public policy underlying the USA PATRIOT
Act, that Yahoo! Inc. had a Tarasoff duty to divulge his identity to us,
voluntarily, upon our request.




69. Id. at 434 (citations omitted).
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XI. Conclusion
The uniquely private nature of the Internet is a mixed blessing.
On the one hand, it facilitates political discourse and social
intercourse free of government intrusion. On the other hand, it can
provide cover for criminal conduct. We should be vigilant against
efforts to undermine the former, while cautiously taking steps to
prevent the latter.
It will not be easy to strike the right balance.
